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Governmental Resistance in International
Intellectual Property Rights

Emily Honig
International Studies honors thesis
13 May 2005

The field of intellectual property, roughly defined as "a product of the intellect
that has commercial value I ," is one of the growing fields of international legal debate, as
the economies of the world become increasingly interconnected and the world's
corporations operate overseas with increasing frequency. The literature in the field of
international law and intellectual property rights (IPRs) tends to suggest that states, for
political or economic reasons, have little choice but to bow to the wishes of multinational
corporations (MNCs) and provide increased protection for IPRs. However, there are a
number of cases that show that under certain circumstances, states and governmental
bodies are willing and able to push back resist these MNCs and defy the general trend
toward greater IPR protection. What are these conditions? When does the balaFlce
between meeting MNCs' demands and other concerns shift?
This question arises largely because wrnle the literature in tbefield do,es well to
explain an overall trend of increased IP protection - one exemplified by the increased IF
protections in the World Trade Organization under the treaty on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)2 - it fa'ils to explain the excepl,ions to this trend.

The American Hen'wge Dictionary, 4 1h Edilion, Houghton-Mifflin Company, 2000.
2 The WTO negotiated its Agreement on Tmde,-Related AspectS of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
during the Uruguay Round of negotiations, which began in 1986 and concluded in 1994. TRIPS includes
protections for an array of different kinds of intellectual property, lincluding copyrights, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, topographies of integrated circuits (i.e. computeF
chips) and trade secrets. Prior to TRIPS, IP was treated in widely v3IYing ways from country to country; by
providing a set of minimum levels of IP protection that each WTO member state must meet by integrating
them into its domestic laws, TRIPS aimed at a standardized, common intemarional IP regime. The
agreement covers five basic areas: application of basic principles sl!lch as non-discrimination and promotion
of innovation; common ground rules based on two World Intellectual Propeny Organization agreements,
the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention, which cover different areas ofIP; as well as additional
rules not covered by these Conventions; adequate domestic enforcement; dispute resolution pro~edures;
and transitional arrangements for the implementation period.. Additionally, there are exceptions t:o the rules
meant to ease adherence, such as in the case of public-health crises. TR[PS also features a mechanism for
dispute resolution. For more information., see
http://www.wto.orgfenglishlthewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htrn
I
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Much of the literature in this field comes from Susan Sell of George Washington
University, who holds that the fonnation and implementation of the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) accord came about at the behest of the
United States-based Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), which is composed of the
chief executives of twelve large MNCs. 3 Additionally, she argues, the IPC has had much
success in influencing international organizations, such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization, a UN agency which she argues is currently "little more than a puppet" for
the IPR and other pro-IPR groupS.4 Although TRIPS, having been formed as part of the
World Trade Organization, is an agreement between states, it has been largely viewed as
a response of member states to their particular domestic political situations and the
lobbying activities of powerful MNCs. Going one step further, Graham Dutfield of the
University College London argues that although developed countries control
policymaking in this area and prefer an IPR-protective regime, it is both unrealistic and
unfair to expect developing countries to adhere immediately to developed countries'
intellectual property protection standards, as this is overly difficult to enforce and could
further inJUbit innovation and development. 5 In short, in the view of Sell, Outfield and
many others, in the field ofIPR, the role of states has been to respond to the demands of
MNCs. This view is representative of one school of thought on international IPRs: the
view that the primary push for IPR protections has always come from the corporate
world.
On the other hand, Keith Maskus of the University of Colorado at Boulder holds
that intellectual property protection is needed by both corporations and states in order to
Sell. 2003, pp. 24-27.
Ibid, p. 20.
s Dutfield, 2004, pp. 50-55.
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foster innovation and attract capital, and countries with weak IPR regimes suffer from
both weaker incentive for innovation and isolation from modem technologies because
corporations are unwilling to introduce them. Thus, he argues, lPR protections are
necessary for economic development. While Maskus notes that IPR protection can slow
development in the short tenn by introducing costs, he argues that "even among poor
economies" a well-structured IP policy is an important condition for business
development. 6 Maskus is an example ofa second school of thought, one in which IPR
protection is a necessary prerequisite for economic development.
Ruth Okediji notes that there is a fine balance between intellectual property rights
and international antitrust legislation, with strong implications for the global market. She
argues that this balance must be maintained through attention to national economic
context,? This view represents a third school of thought on lPRs, which takes a longer
and more complex view of the processes involved and focuses on the specific situations
ofindividual states. Okediji's approach is similar to the one that will be undenaken in
this work; however, while Okediji focuses on national economic factors such as market
structure and foreign investment, this paper's focus is more narrowly focused on
instances of governmental resistance to a protective global IPR regime and the usc of
lFRs as a political instrument. My research will attempt to fill what seems to be a gap in
the literature by extending and deepening the work of this third school of thought and
examiJi.ing more closely the instances in which governments resist M;NCs' demands for
intellectual property rights protection; these are instances in which IPRs seem in fact to
contract.

6
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Maskus, Infellectual property rights in the global economy, 2000. pp. 148-170.
Okediji, 2003, p. 921.
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In sum, my research has led to the conclusion that states will resist the call for IP
protection when their interests and preferences collide with those ofMNCs. At the same
time, though, I argue that the interests and preferences of states are not uniform; that is,
states are motivated by different factors - which in tum are shaped by the distinctive
political situation in which that state operates. For the purposes of this work, a state's
political situation includes the history and nonns in which its poutics are embedded,
domestic and international economics, domestic constituencies and interest groups,
international norms, international interest groups and NGOs. These factors and many
others lead states toward certain policy goals. My study shows that although IPR regimes
are often described as a unidirectional policy tool - that is to say, that states have no
choice but to submit to increasingly protective IPR regimes so as to attract foreign
investment or encourage domestic industrial innovation - this is frequently not the case,
and IPR regim€s are resisted for instrumental reasons as well. IPR resistance is used by
states as a policy tool.

In this study, the dependent variable is resistance to protection of foreign

corporations' IP and the independent variables are the interests and preferences that lead
states to this resistance. While scholars such as Okediji might propose that such
resistance is the result of the particular economies in question, and that in such cases IPR
protection has proved to be less than conducive to economic growth, further study has
shown that this is not an adequate explan~tion because the two do not always go hand in
hand. Rather, while economic growth is always a priority, it is not a reason unto itself for
a state to resist IPRs. It is the state's particular political situation - which includes its

4

economic situation - and policy goals that lead it to the conclusion that such resistance
will be the most advantageous route to econom.ic growth, political ga.in or other long-term
goals. My work has shown that states are not always acting a1 the behest of MNCs. States
are motivated to resist pressure for increasingly protective IPR regimes and even decrease
IPRs when acting in pursuit of their own interests and preferences.

Research ApproaCh and Methods
This research centers on three cases: three instances of states resist.ing IPRs. In
short, the dependent variable in all three of these cases is governmental resistance to
intellectual property rights; the independent variable is different [rom case to case but
each has proven to centraUy involve the state's political i;nterests and preferences.
My case selection aHows me to use a controUed comparison tool, John Stuart
Milil's Method of Difference, which involves searching for cross-case differences which
can account for possible causes oftbe dependent variable. 8 The process of discerning
these differences centrally involves careful examination of tbe independent variabfes in
each of these cases. This is accomplished through process tracing, which is the
exploration of the "chain of events by which initial case 'conditions are translated into
case outcomes.,,9 In this case, that is accomplished through careful examination of
firsthand documentation such as WTO TRIPS notifications, the European Commission
case files, newspaper and journal articles, and primary SOurce material rncluding
interviews with observers in the countries involved, with officials responsible for the
rulings and with officers of the corporations implicated.

8
9

Van Evera, 1997, p. 68.
Ibid., p. 64.
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The first 0 [the three cases that wi 11 be discussed in this paper is that 0 [the tension
between pharmaceutical companies and developing countries, specifically the instance of
AIDS drugs in South Africa in 2001. In this case, the pharmaceutical companies filed a
complaint under TRIPS, but they eventually dropped it because developing countries
cited a provision in TRIPS for the granting of compulsory licenses in the case of public
health emergencies. This was affirmed in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, which
included a specific declaration urging the use of these provisions in public health crises in
developing countries. 10 More recent declarations have affirmed this provision. However,
pharmaceutical corporations have argued that this compulsory licensing will put their
intellectual property at risk, jeopardize their profits in all countries (not just in those that
grant compulsory licenses), and that reduced profit will reduce the incentives [or
innovation. On the surface, the South African go.vemment is driven by a need to protect
its economy from the ravages of AIDS on its workforce.
However, the explanation was and is in reality more complicated, as cheaper and
more conventional methods of preventing HIV transmission, such as promotion of
condom use, are culturally problematic and would carry a greater political cost for South
Africa's president Mbeki. Pushing western pharmaceutical companies for licensing of
their products was and continues to be a politically cheaper tack. I I Additionally, the
outcomes of the lawsuits were dramatically affected by the roles taken by domestic and
international activist groups; the action of such so-called "transnational activist
networks,,12 served to put pressure on the pharmaceutical companies to soften their stance

World Trade Organization, 2001.
"Castro H1ongwane, Caravans, Cats, Geese, Foot and Mouth and Statistics: HIV/AIDS and the Struggle
for the Humanization of the Africau," 2002.
12 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, pp. 1-5.
10
11
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and on the South African government to take a stronger slance against the phannaceutical
companies in the name of satisfying in some way the, need to address the pr:essing AIDS
problem in South Africa. The South African govenunent was inclined to resist the
pharmaceutical companies because it tends to view the West, in general, as largely
responsible for the perpetblation of its major problems, including dle HIV/AIDS
epidemic. However, it has also been too immobilized by a "cultur:e of shame"
surrounding the iss,ue to effectively respond; iJl an effort to retain a complex political
base, the government has waited to act until its hand was forced by pressure from NOGs.
This case serves as an example of a state pushing against powerful MNCs; in this case,
most oflthe impetus has ultimate~y Corne not from ithe governments but from activisl
networks that wefe able to

e~elit

intense press1lI"e on both the government and on the

pharmaceutical companies such that both parties chose to seek IPR protections less
aggressively. In short, the state's self-interest here - the independent variable with which
this study concerns itself ~ lies in the field of social justice and democracy; j.n. a state
ravaged by public health concerns, where the government is reluctant {o act, the political
situation has bee.n such that activist networks have grown and exerted pressure in a
politically-motivated absence of uni lateral action from the government.
The second case is that of the Chinese government, which generally seems to fail
to protect inteJIlecrual property by ignoring threats to it In examples in a number of fields
including the automotive industry and audio, vldeo, and book piracy, China fails to
enforce IPR, despite its WTO membership, through bureaucratic inactivity. Additionally,
many MNCs seeking to do business in China are forced by law to share some of their
intellectual property with the Chinese companies they take on as partners. In sh.on, piracy

7

and counterfeiting run rampant and largely unopposed in China; this runs counter to most
predictions for how developing countries will tend to treat IPR protection and demands
the question of why a country like China would choose to systematically overlook IP
rules. This case will serve as an example of passive governmental resistance to the
international IPR regime represented by TRIPS, incited by an economic nationalism that
flows from deep-seated resentment over a century of Western colonialism and a half
century of Japanese military domination. This nationalism has led the communist state in
Beijing to give preference to the nurturing of domestic firms over the protection of the
intellectual property rights of non-Chinese corporations. \} In the case of China, the
underlying independent variable is economic nationalism.
The third of these cases is the ongoing case in the wake of the 2004 decision in
which the European Commission (EC) stated that Microsoft was abusing its market
position by bundling Windows Media Player with the Windows XP operating system,
and ordered that Microsoft unbundle the software and share some of its source code so
competitors could write media player software that would work se31'TIlessly with
Windows XP. Additionally, the decision stated. that Microsoft was failing to make its
Windows workgroup networking software interoperable with other workgroup systems
and ordered that it release the code that would make these different systems
interoperable. Microsoft is currently in the process of appealing the case in the European
Court of Justice but has already been required to submit plans for implementing the
ruling. Additionally, the EC in August, 2004 launched an investigation into Microsoft's
acquisition of ContentGuard, which produces Digital Rights Management software
(which is intended to prevent digital piracy of software, music, audio and video). In both
13

Shambaugh, 1996, pp. 194 -195.

8

instances, the Ee, acting on behalf of the EU, is pushing against Microsoft in the name of
preserving antitrust law in a growing field, in a manner similar to the antitrust case
against Microsoft in the United Stales. However, in this case, European self-interest is
less obvious. The original complaint that began the EC investigation came from Sun
Microsystems, a software maker based in Santa Clara, CA. M,icrosoft's main Il1edia
player competitor, and the other main corporate proponent of the EC decision, i,s
ReaINetworks, based in Seatde, W A. In fact, Microsoft does not at the moment have any
major competitors based in Europe. Furthennore., European consumer groups have not
been involved in dIe case, and it appears that they wm be Oldy minimally affected oy th.e
decision.
This case is in some respects the outlier oflthe three, as there is n.o immediately
apparent external or internal pressure dIat has led the EC to resist IPRs in th.is way and as
the case has. proceeded ,contrary to the expectations of Sell and others, who would
anticipate that the EC would want to protect IP s'tringently in order to retain Microsoft's
trust and assure nascent EurQpcan software companies that their pwgrams wili be
protected. In Europe, norms of powerful European rule of law

~md

strong, self

perpetuating European bureaucracy have resulted in all' Ee antitrust ruling against
Microsoft that happened to have important connotations in the field ofintemalional IPRs.
The EC invoked these norms not

fOf

the gain of European firms or consumers, but in

order to further the process of European integration and thereby further the entrenchment
of the EU bureaucracy, which includes the EC itself. This case is thus an example of how
nonns can be invoked for means of political gam, creat1ing situati'ons that lessen the
importance of IPR protection in dIe view of states - a process 'that applies [0 all three

9

cases discussed in this paper, and which is useful more broadly to explain examples of
states resisting IPRs in general. In the case of Europe, the independent variable is the
EC's pro-integration policy goals.
It must be noted that these cases are by no means the only recent examples of

states resisting IPRs. Rather, these cases were selected by virtue of their differences. Each
deals with a different market sector, a different kind of IP, a different source of pressure,
a different kind of ewnomy at a different level of development. These wide variations are
vital to the case study methodology undertaken in this work; by working backward from
the end result through the process that took place, the Method of Difference allows the
cases to be compared in such a way that the similarities in circumstance become evident.
Were the cases similar on the surface, this methodology would have failed by showing
too many similarities for a direct wrrelation between the independent variable and the
dependent variable to be established. Thus, the cases were chosen largely because of their
vast differences, which are vital to the methodology.
The bulk of this paper deals with these three case studies, examining the
processes in each instance and exploring the IP implications. First, I examine the South
African case, with focus on the role of political culture and transnational activist
networks. Then, I discuss the Chinese case, focusing on the role of China's pro·economic
growth political culture. Finally, I study the European case, where political culture and
antitrust priorities intersect to deprioritize IPR protections. Going forward, the notion of
political culture affecting the global market, particularly in a sector of rising importance
like IP, is a powerful question that demands further exploration.

10

SOUTH AFRICA AND PHARMACEUTICAL CORPORATIONS

One prime example of the pathways intellectual property rights can take in a
developing country is that of South Africa. Over the past two decades, AIDS has become
such a severe problem in South Africa that it is now widely agreed that this country has a
higher number of HIV-positive citizens than any other country in the world. 14 This has
caused immense social problems and crippled the economy, as the group worst affected is
people of working age. Amidst the exponential growth of this epidemic, which continues
through the present, the South African, government has generally failed to react in a
timely and effective manner, due in large part to political and

cu~tural

factors that have

caused a perception that it would be politically costly to dtiscuss and address the problem.
Thus, while the government has resisted IPRs by us1mg TRIPS-compliant exceptions in
order to gain compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs, such actions came about less on ,the
initiative of ~he government than because of an especially charismatic brand of domestic
and international activism - including a centrally important domestic activist group, the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) - that has brought international attention and
pressure on both the government and on the phannaceutical companies that supply the
drugs. By this kind of passive reluctance, the Mbelci government hopes to avert tbe public
eye from the AIDS crisis while simultaneously responding to public pressure from the
TAC and this transnational activist network. In short, while the South African
government has been paralyzed by conflicting policy goals wilth regard Ito AIDS, actions
taken by NGOs, both domestically and intcmationafIy, nav,e repeated~y prodded the
government into action. By avoiding unilateral action until its hand has been forced by
14

United Nations, 2004.
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public pressure, the government is attempting to navigate a set of obstacles in such a way
as to allow it to retain a complex political base.
The extent of the spread ofRN/AIDS in South Africa is unquestionably severe.

In fact, the situation has been worsening for years, and dramatically affects the South
African working population. The 2002 Nelson Mandela Study, a household survey of
more than 14,000 people, indicated that 11.4 percent of the population over the age of
two was HIV-positive, that women had a higher infection rate than men and that the age
group most affected was between 25 and 29 years for women and 30 and 34 years for
men. IS Other estimates of the country's overaU infect'ion rate range from 10 to 25
percent. 16 This proportion has grown dramatically since 1990, when the high estimate
was 10 percent; modeling shows that the number is still climbing. 17 The UN AIDS 2004
report shows a similar result.
However, the actual extent ofHN infection in South Africa, as elsewhere, has
been difficult to quantify as people are unwilling to be tested for the virus, perhaps
because they know that the result is likely to be positive. In the Nelson Maodela Study,
only 65 percent of people surveyed were willing to take the test, a fairly good response
rate among similar studies. IS In addition to difficulties caused by resistance to HIV
testing, quantification of the HIV epidemic is complicated by the fact that very few
deaths are attributed to AIDS-related illnesses, although almost all South Africans who
die of certain causes, such as tuberculosis, have actually died of AIDS.

Berry, Fredrikkson, and Noble, 2005.
"Mid-year populaiion estimates, South Africa: Key fmdings," 2004.
17 "South Africa HEY/AIDS rates are warning for Russia, China, India," 2004.
IS Berry, Fredrik)lson and Noble, op. cit
19 Ibid.
15
16
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This lack of

accurate reporting stems from unwillingness on the part of families and doctors to label
the dead with a diagnosis as stigmatizing as AIDS.
This kind of resistance points to what is often called a "culture of shame"
surrounding HIV/AIDS in South Africa. People are unwilling to be tested for it,
unwilling to admit infection and unwilling to discuss means for prevention and treatment
of the disease's spread. This makes public-health measures such as education aimed at
prevention difficult. Additionally, the particular economic situaltion in South Africa,
featuring an extremely wide wealth gap, worseIlS tne 'situation as AIDS has been shown
to be a "disease of poverty" - characterized by hi'gher infection rates with lower income
leve1. 2o While the exact causes of the severity of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa and
countries like it are complicated and closely linked to domestic social fa.ctors, the result is
striking: South Africa's economy has been hanned by the large perceutage of its work
force that is mv -positive, and the epidemic still seems to be on the upswing.
Unfortunately, as in many developing ,countries ravaged by AIDS, the South
African govenunent has been less than amenable to the most successful method of
solving the problem, education about safer sex practices that would prevent the disease's
spread. While the South Afr,ican government, led by President Thabo Mbeki, declared in
2003 that it would provide antiretroviral drugs (ARVS)21 to aU HIV -infected South
Africans, this pledge has yet to be put fully mto action and has for two years running

Gillies and Wolstenhome, 1996.
AotiretroYiral drugs are a class of'drugs aimed specifically al the category ofYirus in which RlV finds
itself, retroviruses. Since such viruses muta.te constantly when they replicate, it has proved difficult to
attack the virus itself; T1lther, ARVs work by suppressing replication and increasing It'be likelihood that
viruses will be unable to survive such mutations. ARVs are usually used in a "cocktail" featwing a number
of different kinds of drugs in order Ito 'increase the likelihood of pos~tive resuhs, CU!Tentfy, with careful
ARV use HIV virus counts can be dramatically lowered. Unfortunately, the drugs are very expensive. it 'i.s
often difficult for patients to take the large number of pills required by such cocktails and ARV drugs often
have serious side effects.
20

21
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failed to meet government-set progress goals. 22 Although the government has blamed
these setbacks on a lack of adequate medical staffing or on the expense of developing
effective education programs, critics have accused Mbeki of failing to adequately
prioritize stemming the country's AIDS epidemic.
There are a number of reasons the Mbeki government has been reticent and
roundabout in discussing and dealing with the epidemic. Its preference for dubious
homegrown treatments over scientifically proven Western medicine is most likely a result
of years of Apartheid resentment; in emphasizing the link between poverty and AIDS, the
Mibeki gov,ernment has emphasized the legacy of poverty and disease the white minority
created for the black majority. For example, in a 2004 parliamentary debate, Mbeki
criticized the perceived legacy of white people and apartheid in the AIDS problem:
"I will not keep quiet while others whose minds have been corrupted by
the disease of racism accuse us, the black people of South Africa, Africa
and the world, as being, by virtue of our Africanness and slUn colour, lazy,
liars, foul-smelling, diseased, corrupt, violent, amoral, sexually depraved,
animalistic, savages and rapists.',23
Furthermore, Mbeki has mentioned that he does not want Africans to be stigmatized as
"sub-human disease carriers,,,24 insisting that honest discussion of AIDS creates a kind of
vicious cycle of stigmatization which prevents South Africa from moving past its

po~t-

Apartheid poverty and social unrest. The Mbeki government's stance results from the
"culture of shame" surrounding AIDS; by circumventing the issue, it hopes to avoid
alienating the electorate, a consequence it believes would result from being open about
the problem. By making an issue of public health into an issue of race and class,
however, the government takes the focus 0 ff of the disease itself and the need to solve a

12

13

H

South Africa AIDS Health.
Mbeki, 2004.
Carroll. 2004.
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large-scale public health crisis and makes it seem like in order to decrease the severity of
the AIDS epidemic the weallLh gap would need! to be eliminated, a problem that is much
harder to solve. [t is important to note that this is not only a [iesult of embracing South
Afucan culture in a post-Apartheid era: equaHy, i,t represents rejection of a white,
Western cultlwe that disenfranchised the South African majority for decades. Forty years
ago, white doctors in Cape Town were pioneering the first kidney and heart transplants;25
that the South African gov,emment took so long to embraoe proven Western treatments
for a deadly disease is telling.
Indeed, the government's pro-ARY stance on HIV/AIDS is a new one. As
recently as 2001, Mbeki's party, the African National Congress (ANC), published a
lengthy document questioning the link between HN and AIDS. calling antiretroviral
drugs (ARVs) toxic and ineffective and recommending "holistic healing" such as
massage, yoga and herbal remedies. 26 Also in 200 1, Mbeki' s President AIDS Advisory
Panel brought together Western doctors and researchers and so-called "AIDS dissidents"
- the small percentage of researchers who disagree with the description of AIDS as a
syndrome caused by the HIV virus - in an attempt to reach a compromise between the
two positions. As recently as 2003, the Mbeki government was threatening to
"deregister" nepivarine, an ARY used to prevent transmission ofHIV from mother to
child. Mbeki's health minister has been called "Dr. Garlic" for preaching the anti-AIDS
effectiveness of this herb. In short, by aligning itself with AIDS dissidents, Mbeki and the
ANC have de-emphasized - almost ignored - the role of the virus itself. While it is an
admirable goal to speak of the important role of poverty in the AIDS problem, the Mbeki
''The world's fIrst heart transplant," 2000.
"Castro Hlongwane, Caravans, Cats, Geese, Foot and Mouth and Statistics: HN/AlDS and the struggle
for the humanization of the African," 2002.
25

26
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government's reticence on the subject bas proved harmful. Even now, Mbeki shies away
from public mention of the disease, barely mentioning it in his 2004 State of the Union
address.'27 Additionally, the Mbeki government - like the Mandela government before it,
in which Mbeki played. a large role in setting AIDS policy - has been suspicious of
"Western," mainSlTeam approaches to AIDS, preferring to encourage

homegro~ South

African research and treatments. For example, in 1998, while chairing the InterMinisterial Committee on HN/ AIDS, Mbeki publicly criticized the Medicines Control
Councill (MCC), accusing it of promoting MNCs' interests at the expense of local
competition when it refused to rush to clinical trial a drug caned Virodene, developed at
the University of Pretoria. However, the MCC's reluctance was sensible,

as Virodene

was essentially a scam: it was derived from dry-cleaning fluid, and illegal preliminary
trials had shown no effectiveness and raised concerns about liver damage. 28
Finally, discussion of AIDS is politically difficult in South Africa; it is a sensitive
topic, and misinformation runs rampant. While former president Nelson Mandela recently
has been lauded for coming forward to refute AIDS dissidents and admit that his own son
had died of AIDS ,29 he only did so after having been retired for several years. Public
discussion of AIDS involves discussion of topics that remain stubbornly stigmatic and
taboo: sexual promiscuity, prostitution, birth control. Worse, such discussions and
educationaD measures as have been attempted have proven to be largely unsuccessful;
AIDS Law Project expert Jonathan Berger notes that there continue to be more new
infections than AIDS-related deaths in South Africa, indicating that the epidemic is still
on the rise. ''This approach is not working because it is not open or honest about sex and
Baleta, "South African president criricized for lack of focus on AIDS," 2004.
Lodge, 2003, p. 256.
29 "Mandela's grief challenges South Africa AIDS stigma.," 2005.
27

28
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sexuaJity.',30 In short, the AIDS epidemic has left the South African government with two
unattractive options: at1empt to stem the tide with public health measures such as
comprehensive, community-based safer sex education, or accepting mainstream science
so far as to promote the use ofantiretroviral medications (ARVs). While ideally these
two methods would work in tandem, this has not been the tactic taken by the South
African government.
Instead, the result has been that in its AIDS programs, the Soutb African
government has placed emphasis on antiretroviral medications while such educationbased public health measures have been pushed into the background. Berg,er noted that
"other measures, such as ARVS to prevent mother-to-chi~d transmission~ are far easi.er to
implement than behavioral changes," such as thosc' that could be brought about by
educational measures. 3 ! Nonetheless, ARVs !have pres·ented a conundrum for the South
African government for a number of reasons. One main cause is the instrumental view of
IPRs taken by the Mbeki government,

whic~

in accordance with the popular scholar,ly

opinion on increasing IPRs, would prefer to protect IPRs in order to attract MNCs and
foreign direct investment, thereby hopefuUy fostering economic development. In
addition, there are important politicai factors as discussed above, in which the ANC has
resisted mainstream, Western explanations for the AIDS epidemic in favor of embracing
tradition.al explanations and remedies. The eventual acceptance of ARV drugs has not
been an easy decision for the Mbeki government, which is worried about South Africa's
international image, both in terms of foreign investment and in terms of Fac,ialiized public
health.

30
)1

Berger, 2005.
Ibid.
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An additional source of difficulty came from the manufacturers of AIDS drugs, a

number of different pharmaceutical companies. Prior to about 1997, when the Medicines
and Related Substances Act was amended to allow for TRIPS-compliant compulsory
licensing and parallel importation,32 AIDS drugs in South Africa were mostly patented
and therefore very expensive; to make matters worse, prices were often set higher in
South Africa than in developed countries such as the United States. Drug companies were
resistant to donating drugs, selling them at a lower price in countries affected by AIDS or
selling licenses allowing generics to be manufactured because, they argued, this would
allow for illegal worldwide distribution of cheap AIDS drugs, decreasing the profit to be
made from such drugs and thereby, at least according to the drug companies, lessening
the incentive to innovate in the field. Prior to the advent of TRIPS in 1994 and the
resultant domestic legislation, then, AIDS drugs were expensive, hard to come by, and
only available to a small, well-off segment of the South African population.
In 1997, in an attempt to remedy high drug prices with legislation, the Mandela
government passed the Medicines and Related Substances Act, which allowed for
TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing and parallel importation for AIDS drugs. Berger
notes that the implementation of the Medicines Act was itself a result of a cbam.ge In
South African politics brought on by international factors: "[the Medicines Act] was
passed at a particular time in history," under the Mandela government at a time of

n While TRIPS was conceived in order to protect IPRs lntematlonaUy, it contains a number ofprovlsioDS
intended to protect public health, particularly in cases such as the AIDS situation in South Africa. These
provisions include compulsory licensing ofpateored drugs in a public health emergency, permission for
such countries to begin work on generics before patents expire, and parallel imponing of drugs, which
allows a country to buy drugs from countries where the drug is available cheaper, without the permission of
the drug's maker. In order for these provisions to take effect, they must be included within domestic patent
laws, such as the Medicines and Related Substances ACL
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confusion and optimism followmg the implementation of TRIPS. 33 AdditionaHy, there
was a sense of optimism about the possibilities for a post-Apartheid South Africa after
the first free ,elections w.ere held

m1994; the Medicines Act was a response to these new

possibilities, viewed as a way to have Western drug companies help pay for a problem
that was perceived to be the fault of the West.
In 1998, 39 phannaceutical companies, members of a trade group called the

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), filed suit against the South African
government over the Medicines Act. The phannaceutical companies alleged that
application of a law like the Medicines Act would "deprive owners of intellectual
property" and that it was "discriminatory in respect of the enjoyment of patent rights in
the phannaceutical field," and as such in conflict with TRJJ>S.34 While the case was
eventually dropped by the PMA, subsequently many of the Medicines Act provisions
were declared unconstitutional. "[The government] got into a lot of trouble [with
pharmaceutical companies]

00

account of the Medicines Act; it has been very hesitant to

properly take on the industry since then," Berger noted. "This is representative of a
broader South African approach to trade; there is an unwillingness to push boundaries;
[the government) doesn't want to suggest that South Africa is not investmcnt-friendly."35
This treod was continued in 2003, when the South African Competition
Commission ruled that drug companies GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim had
abused their market position by charging too much for their AIDS drugs and that South
African generic drug manufacturers should be able to make the drugs without seeking

Berger, op. cit.
Phannaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa v. the President of the Republic of South
Africa, 200].
J~ Berger, op. cit
3J
J.I
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permission from the patent holder. The case, being a precedent, went to appeal; it was
settled later in 2003, paving the way for generic AIDS drug manufacture in South
AfriCa,36

and therefore for implementation of the Mbeki government's 2003 ARV pledge.

Nonetheless, the settlement of this case and of the 2001 PMA case raised questions about
why the drug companies would so willingly relent to unfavorable terms. "It's hard to
know how this came about, but there are suspicions," Berger said. "The abandonment of
the case in 2001 was a settlement on problematic terms [for the South African
government]. It raises the possibility ofbackroom deals being made that limit South
African action ... there may have been more subtle threats made behind closed doors. That
South Africa is not seen on the Special 30 I list 37 does not mean there is no pressure from
the U.S. Trade Representative. ,,3g
In short, yvhile the South African government has the tools to take on the
pharmaceuticals industry and push for cheap generic drugs - tools including TRIPS and
the Doha Declaration, which validated the Medicines Act - it bas not done so. This is
especially evident when one considers the examples of India and Brazil, from which
cheap generic drugs are exported to South Africa and other developing countries,
primarily by NGOs like the TAC. In Brazil, for example, the government has
aggressively used TRIPS public-health exceptions to order compulsory licensing for
AIDS drugs, resulting in generic AIDS drugs that are dramatically cheaper than those
available in many other developing countries. Brazil apparently does not share South

Complainants v. GSK., 2003.
The Special 301 Watch List, compiled each year by the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).
is a list of couotries that, in the view of the USTR, have "the most onerous or egregious policies" on U.S.
rPR holders. See:
hnp :/lwww.ustr.govlDocument_LibrarylReports_Publicatlons/200412004_Specia 1_30 I/Section_Index. hnnl
38 Berger. op. cit.
36
37
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African fears of harming foreign investment. For example, Brazil has threatened to flout
patent laws in order to compel phannaceutical companies to offer licenses; in 2001, the
Brazilian government declared that if world market prices for two AIDS drugs did not
decrease, it would allow Brazilian companies to produce them regardless ofpatents. 39
South African AIDS interest groups, including the TAC, have imported cheap Brazilian
drugs to make a point about South African drug prices and to demonstrate wbat could be
accomplished in South Africa if TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions were put into
use more aggressively.40 Although India recently implemented stricter patent laws, lits
booming generic drug industry has, like that of Brazil, also been used as a tool to
encourage domestic competition in the hopes of pushing ARV drug prices down. 41 The
fact that there are other countries using WTO and other mechanisms to produce cheaper
generic drugs has resulted in additional external pressure on companies selling AIDS
drugs in South Africa to license them more cheaply, and on generic drug companies in
South Africa to produce more effectively. This pressure has not come from the
government, but from a combination of AIDS activist groups and other outside actorsmuch like the pressure that resulted in the eventual dropping of the Medicines Act case.
An important actor in both cases was the TAC, a pro-ARV interest group founded
in 1998 and headed by Zackie Achmat, an intensely charismatic activist. Achmat, who

was an underground anti-Apartheid activist prior to the free elections in 1994, was
diagnosed with AIDS in 1990, and has since then refused to take ARVs until

~hey

are

available to everyone at an affordable price. 42 Achmat's story is one that commands

39

Buckley, 200 I.
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41 "The future of generic medicines made in I.ndia," 2005.
42 Hawthorne, 2003.
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attention. Following the filing of the 1998 suit, the TAC engaged in civil disobedience

43

and was granted amicus curiae status in the case, which was then adjourned to allow the
drug companies more time to prepare their case. The case attracted intensive international
notice even affecting the U.S. presidential race: in 1999 Al Gore faced a storm of
criticism during his campaign when he opposed compulsory licensing of AIDS drugs in
poor countries. In 2001, the case was dropped entirely following intense pressure on the
drug companies from international and South African interest groups such as the TAC.
Fonner president Nelson Mandela has also become increasingly vocal, and has attracted a
significant amount of international attention to the subject. Much as activist groups did
during Apartheid, the TAC has attracted international attention to its case by appealing to
an international nann, the sense that life-saving health care is a fundamental right that
should not be infringed upoJ\ particularly not by seemingly arbitrarily hjgh drug prices or
an unacceptably skeptical government. The transnational activist network that fanned
around this nann violation has exerted pressure on the drug companies, who have of late
agreed to license some drugs to South African manufacturers, and on the South African
government. which was forced to resume the case after a year of stalling.
Therefore, it can be sunnised that as cheap access to ARVs is a necessary
precondition for their wider use in a developing country like South Africa, and as the
Mbeki government has not been especially enthusiastic about addressing the AIDS
epidemic either by education or by ARV admi.nistration, the pressure that led to
decreased protection for the pharmaceutical companies' patents came not from the Mbeki
goverrunent, but from extra-governmental sources, both domestic and international: in
short, a transnational activist network arose in the midst of this policy vacuum to apply
4)
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pressure in what was widely agreed to be an unacceptable situation. 44 Additionally, this
pressure was exerted on both the government and on the drug companies, leading the
government to make rulings that decreased IPR protection and increased the availability
of generic drugs and leading the phannaceutical companies to less aggressively seek
protection for their AIDS drug patents. Continued pressure and action in generic drug
pricing and on AIDS educat,ion and other prevention measures has come from the TAC,
not from the government. The government appears to have lost stearn with time, a
predictable result as the impetus for its measures has come from outside sources.
The process of events is complex, but it can be summarized as follows: with
initial conditions including a government that was unwilling to deal actively with the
AIDS problem, the advent of TRIPS and the PMA case, the intervention of the TAC and
transnational activist networks led eventually to loosened lPR for AIDS drugs in South
Africa and a still-reluctant government that has no choice but to act. Thanks to
charismatic leaders, including Achmat and, later, Mandela, a transnational activist
network grew up surrounding the AIDS situation in South Africa, and this led essentially
to the government having to choice but to resist IPRs. Thus, this network has forced a
change in the government's AIDS policy; the ball has essentially begun rolling and
although the Mbeki government may have preferred otherwise, it now has no choice but
to support AIDS drug initiatives. In South Africa, a transnational activist network
essentially hijacked this particular policy area when the government proved to be
paralyzed. As predicted by Marxist theorists like Susan Sell, the Mbeki government has
been cowed by the economic power ofMNCs; its seemingly dramatic anti-IPR stance is a
response to its domestic constituents and to international pressure. Further, it has used its
.u
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AIDS policy as an instrument: its eventual embrace of ARVs is a result of a desire to
avoid distasteful education and public health measures. In denying the extent of the
problem, it is attempting to minimize the seriousness of post-Apartheid poverty; by
blaming the problem on racism, it suggests that this poverty is the result of Western- and
Apartheid-perpetuated social problems; by claiming that homegrown South African
remedies will stem the epidemic, it asserts that South Africa does not need the help of the
West to solve its problems. However, the policy-changing role ofNGOs in this story
suggests that there are important actors outside of the statelMNC model commonly
suggested in the IPR field.

24

COUNTERFEIT AND PIRACY IN ClllNA: PASSIVE GOVERNMENTAL
RESISTANCE

The Chinese IPR situation is something of a conundrum, in that the words and the
actions of the government are surprisingly out of sync. While there are perfectly adequate
IP laws on the books in China, there is a systematic lack of enforcement that essentially
amounts to passive resistance to intellectual property rights on the part of the Chinese
government. This is surprising, as it runs counter not only to China's international
obligations as a WTO member but to expectations of the behavior of a developing
country with regard to IPRs. For example, Keith Maskus argues that intellectual property
protection is needed by developing countries in order to attract foreign capitaL Susan Sell
holds that in the IPR field, states will generally acquiesce to the demands of corporations
in order to attract and keep the corporations' money. Why has does the Chinese case run
counter to these expectations? Why does Supreme Court Judge Jiang Zhipei suggest,
rather, tha~ "perhaps some foreign companies need much more patience,,?45 This study
will examine the automotive industry in China within the wider IPR situation in hopes of
illustrating the reasoning behind the behavior of the Chinese government, suggesting that
its roots lie in a form of economic nationalism stemming from China's

century~long

humiliation at the hands of colonial powers ranging from Great Britain to Japan.
One common explanation for the contrast between the law and the reality of IPR
protection in China, offered by William P. Alford, is that in a centralized state like China,
where the government seeks to control the flow of ideas (for example, by controlling the
news media and which internet sites Chinese nationals can view), there is no room for
4~
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free flow of ideas, and thus there is no room for protection of these ideas.

46

However,

such an ideological explanation is weak as an explanation for such a widespread and
systematic phenomenon as the Chinese government's passive resistance to IPRs. As
protective IP regimes are by deftnition restrictive of the flow of ideas, the alternative (the
lack of an effective IP regime, as in the current state of affairs in China) would lead to
more, not less, exchange of ideas. Rather, there is a concrete economic, rather than
ideological, reason behind this phenomenon. There are a number of different political and
economic forces at work in this instance. First, and most important, is the Chinese
government's developmentalist approach to its economy, which prioritizes the growth of
domestic industries ahead of protecting foreign corporations' IP. Secondarily, there is the
level of interplay between domestic Chinese politics and international politics; the
Chinese government, in navigating between international demands for IPR protections
and the goal of domestic economic growth, has chosen a "middle path" consisting of
poorly enforced legal protections.
It is difficult to determine the extent ofthe piracy problem in China; estimates
vary widely, and official data is somewhat sparse. Estimates of the total value of
counterfeited goods produced annually in China range from $16 billion up to $50 billion.
Furthermore, it is likely that only a small percentage of individuals involved are caught or
punished: In 2001, the Development Research Committee for the Quality Brands
Protection Committee (QBPC), a pro-lPR group comprised of more than 100
multinational corporations operating in China, estimated that the proportion of the value
of investigated goods to the total counterfeits of enterprises was about 8.3 percent, a

46
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figure that had only slightly increased from the previous year.

41

In November, 2004, the

Chinese government commenced "Operation Eagle," a large-scale crackdown on the
counterfeiting of goods; at the time of writing, 419 people had been arrested. However, it
is likely that this represents only a fraction of the problem; trade groups and websites
dealing with IPRs in China list hundreds of stories of offenses. The sheer number of cases
described indicates that the problem is widespread and diversely pervasive. Although the
losses to foreign companies are difficult to quantify because a large portion of the goods
in question are sold in China and it is questionable whether Chinese consumers would
pay a higher price for authentic goods,4B the U.S. Department of Commerce has estimated
that U.S. companies lose more than a billion dollars in revenue annually.49
Foreign companies sue frequently in an attempt to gain protection for their IP;
most of these have to do with trademark infringement. Typical examples including BMW
suing Beijing BAOMA, a Chinese company it had formerly had ties with that continued
using the BMW trademark after the business relationship had ended,s° and Yamaha suing
when a company using Yamaha parts in its engines lettered its trademark so as to make it
appear that the engine was made by Yamaha. 51 Interestingly, in 2004 the State Trademark
Review and Adjudication Board was sued for "administrative inaction" for the first time.
The case involves a dispute in which the trademark of a German company, Henkel, was
deemed by a Chinese company, Chengdu Yashen Chemical Co. Ltd., to be unacceptably
similar to its own, and thus attempte9 to cancel Henkel's trademarks six times; the TRAB
accepted the cancellation applications and the associated fees on all six occasions, but has
"Survey on the Effects ofCounlerfeiting on the National Economy," 2004.
Fishman, China. Inc., 2005, p. 246.
49 Fishman, "Manufaketure," 2005, pp. 40-44.
50 "BMW rues complaint with Beijing AlC for trademark infringement," 2004.
51 "Yamaha wins trademark infringement case; awarded RMB 400,000 damages," 2004.
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failed to issue a decision. This case has not yet been decided. 52 Although this case deals
with a Chinese complainant and a foreign defendant, it is illustrative that corporations are
frustrated with the inefficacy of the administrative bodies that are meant to protect IPRs.
Raids in all sectors are widely publicized, but they evidently continue to fail at
deterring counterfeiters. In Jillle, 2004, an auto-parts manufacturer was fined for
producing counterfeit Mitsubishi and Toyota shock absorbers, but the fine ofRMB
200,000 (about $24,000) was less than the value of the counterfeit goods that had been
sold, which was RMB 272,621 (about $32,750);53 such "slap~on-the-wrist" penalties are
common. In its press release for its ''Best Cases Awards," an award intended to reward
Chinese authorities for their "exemplary efforts" in handling IPR violations, the QBPC
describes this paradox:
In recent years, QBPC members have observed notable progress, made by
the Chinese government in criminal enforcement against trademark
cO"W1terfeiting. However, the overall 1evel of deterrence created by both
criminall and administrative ,enforcement has been insufficient to create
positive results for the vast majority of our members, as well as local
brand owners. QBPC members report that over the last two years, the
number of infringement cases transferred! to public security authorities has
not significantly increased, and there has been an overall reduct~on in the
size of fines issued by administrative 'enforcers against counterfeilters. 54
It is striking that in a press release intended! to applaud Chinese authori,ties for their
efforts, IthiS group representing the firms that should! be the beneficiaries of IPR
enforcement cannot help but point out the woeful inadequacies.

In January oi200S, the PRC adopted a new official interpretation of how to
handle criminal cases of intellectual property infringement. It outlines "serious
circumstances" of violation for coilllterfeiting of patents and trademarks, for example
"State Trademark Review and Adjudication Board sued for administrative inaction for the first time,"
2004.
53 "An alita-parts company fUles RMB 200,000 for its counterfeit TOYOTA and MITSUBISHI," 2004.
~ "QBPC presents Best Cases Awards to Chinese IPR enforcers," 2004.
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calling for a fine andlor a maximum of three years of detention for cases in which illegal
gains are more than RMB 200,000 (about $24,000) or "direct economic losses" to the
patent holder of more than RMB 500,000 (about $60,400).~~ "Especially serious
circumstances," those in which the amount of sales of goods with copied trademarks is
more than RMB 150,000 (about $18,100) merit a fine and a prison term ofberween three
and seven years. Further, ''whoever causes losses of more than RMB 2.5 million [about
$302,000] to the obligee of business secrets and thus falls under the definition of ' the
consequences are especially serious' ... shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of
not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined for
conunining the crime of infringing on business secrets." In short, there are criminal laws
on the books for the punishment ofIPR-related infringements, although they may have
been put into place to give the appearance of effort or of a stricter regime. However, the
penalties that are implemented have up to now been so low as to fail to discourage
infringement. In contrast, in the U.S. there are no criminal penalties for patent
infringement (although the Digital Millennium Copyright Act allows for criminal
penalties for copyright infringement), but there are no monetary limits in place for
enforcement of the civil laws, thus making it much easier for panies to file patent
infringement complaints. 56
Furthermore, in very few cases are criminal charges ever brought; the thresholds
for the monetary value of the counterfeit goods in question that rollst be met before
prosecutors will investigate a case remain relatively high, and ilt can also be difficult for a
complainant to prove that they have been met. Between 2000 and 2004, Chinese public

~~ "l[]terpretation by the SPC in Handling Criminal Cases of Infringing lnlelleemal Property," 2004.
~6 "FAQs: Patent law, the patent application process and more," 2002.
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security officials arrested 7, I00 people on suspicion of IPR infringement, but
prosecutions were only initiated in 2,566 cases.

57

The cause for such a discrepancy is

often unclear. For example, although computer software is widely and unapologetically
pirated, software companies might have a hard time convincing government officials of
the amount of economic loss that has resulted. In the 2004 Special 301 Report on global
IPR protections, the Office of the United States Trade Representative complained that in
such cases, "valuation calculations are not usually done using the price of the legitimate
good,,,S8 meaning that often the loss is calculated as the total at the lower, illegal price,
not what the goods would cost if they were legitimate. Additionally, because the price of
authentic software is prohibitively high, it is likely that few would be willing or able to
buy it even if the pirated versions did not exist, so it can be argued that monetary losses
are much lower than they may appear and lower than the injured party may believe. 59 Just
because people will buy an extremely cheap pirated version of a piece of software does
not mean that they would be willing to purchase the fiIlI-price legal version which could
cost a hundred times as much. It is also unclear how the authorities choose which
offenses to investigate or punish and which to leave alone entirely, and some observers
have noted that there often seems to be some kind of political motivation. For example,
as many of the Chinese enterprises accused of counterfeit manufacture are at least
partially stale-owned, particularly in the automotive industry, the Chinese government
has little interest in seeing such enterprises caught and punished. In one ongoing case,
General Motors has filed suit in Shanghai accusing an automotive manufacturer, Chery,
of copying designs for the Daewoo Matiz minicar (Daewoo is GM's South Korean unit).
57 People's Republic of China, "New progress in China 's prol~tion of intellectual property rigblS." 2005.
58 United States of America, ''2004 Special 301 Report Section 306," 2004.
59 Fishman, China, [nc., op. cit., p. 246.
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Because the majority share of Chery is owned by the city government in Wuhu, Anhui
province, the local authorities are likely to fight both the case and implementation of any
penalties. 60 This is thus a government-perpetuated cycle of IPR infringement.

In

additio~

there are few actual lawsuits over industrial design theft because so

many foreign manufacturing companies form direct partnerships with domestic
companies and in these cases the Chinese government requires that all inteUectual
property, including that brought to the partnership by the foreign partner, is to be shared
equally. This is a v,ery dear example of the Chinese govemment using its intellectual
property laws as industrial policy: by giving 'these domestic partners aD equal share in
foreign investors' IP, it is giving them access to the technology and designs of bigger
companies that have had enough success to operate multinationallly, and allowing them to
compete with these companies right off the ground. Therefore, companies bringing
proprietary technology to the deal must first come to teans with the fact that their
Chinese partners are allowed to distribute these technologies however they see fit. 61
Tomoo Marukawa, an expert on Chinese industrial development at the University of
Tokyo, describes the situation as a strategic quandary for Japanese firms operatmg in
China:
Weak IPR protection and enforcement makes [it difficult for] Japanese
companies to compete in low-end products, because domestic companies
can easily copy Japanese technology and design in such produots. Hence
Japanese companies have to focus on high-end products, for which
domestic companies do not have the capacity to copy the technology. 62
While an expected result according to the Maskus way of thinking might be that foreign
cOl']Jorations would be repelled by the IPR conditions in China, the fact is that they
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continue to be attracted by low production costs, and thus ftnd ways to minimize the
losses. Manufacturing corporations that might prefer to protect their intellectual property
- for example, industrial designs - by manufacturing outside of China find themselves at
a disadvantage because their competitors may not share their concerns, or may have
strategized more effectively against them. The sheer size of the markets and
manufacturing capabilities make investment in China an irresistible prospect for many
multinational ftrms, regardless of the potential IPR problems that may result.
In fact, charges of any kind, criminal or otherwise, are rarely brought, and

penalties are rarely imposed, despite the fact that Chinese IPR law is WTO-compliant and
largely comparable to laws in other countries. 63 The problem is not in the laws
themselves. Rather, the problem is that the laws are only selectively enforced. This
selectivity seems to be systemic. China is somewhat unique in that its IP laws are
enforced by a patchwork of administrative bodies, rather tban primarily in the courts. 64
This entails a large number of different government bodies on the local level, making for
an opaque system that can be difficult and time-consuming for a complainant to navigate.
Furthermore, each of the enforcing administrative bodies may have different political
motivations and, thus, different views on how the codes should be implemented. For
example, Marukawa notes that:
Some government organs, for example the Bureau of Vehicle
Certification, do not apply the law so strictly. It is said that the Bureau
may authorize a new model ofmolorcyc1e 'ifit is more than 5 percent
different from existing models.' Hence, hundreds of motorcycles, which
are virtually copies of Honda's motor cycles, have been authorized. 65

63
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As the automotive industry, including motorcycles, is a sector that the Chinese
government hopes to grow into an exporting industry (and, in fact, it has already begun
exporting to down-market locations where it docs not face competition from well-known
global firms~, enforcement here is lax, and the government seems to be using the laws
to help domestic flOns along. As one Chinese report put it,
Exporting automobiles and auto parts, especially the large-scale cxpor1 of
independent brands possessing their own intellectual property, reflects a
country's level of industrial technological development, as well as its
overall competitiveness. China's Ministry of Commerce has thus decided
to encourage and support the global market expansion of automobile
production companies possessing intellectual property.67
For example, in 2001 SIPO revoked Honda's 1994 patent for a "mini-motorcycle,"
saying that a patent had already been issued to a domestic finn for a similar design;68 that
the ruling was eventually overturned when the Shanghai High Court found that the
designs were not excessively similar is telling. SIPO, by making such rulings, shows
itself to be leaning favorably toward domestic finns, despite its statements to the
contrary.
While these administrative bodies play the largest role in administering and
enforcing IF law, the People's Courts also have a certain amount of involvement,
although their clout is limited by the tendency toward centralized administration, by local
prosecutors that mayor may not choose to investigate cases and by budget concems. 69
However, the trends and tendencies in the People's Courts are indicative of the broader
IPR climate. In addition to the thousands of Primary courts (which generally do not hear
IP cases), hundreds of Intermediate courts and 30 High courts, there are three specific
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courts set up to deal wi th questions of intellectual property rights, the Intellectual
Property Trial Chamber of Fujian Higher People's Court, the Intellectual Property Trial
Chamber of Tianjin Higher People's Court and the Intellectual Property Right Tribunal of
Szechwan Higher People's Court. 70 These three special courts are part of a largelyunsuccessful push on the part of the Chinese courts to have more jurisdiction in the field
ofIPRs. Supreme Court Judge Jiang Zhipei, who specializes in IPR cases, complained
that, "The administrative enforcement {of rulings and laws] is weak sometimes and most
of the IF owners also do not like to sue [for] piracy [in] the Court. They think [the
procedure is] so complicated.,,7) This lack ofjudicial power in IPR cases is significant;
the government does not encourage the channeling of power to a body interested in full
enforcement because it sees a big economic benefit in doing otherwise. However, it is
unclear if increasing the role of the courts in IPR enforcement would ameliorate the
situation. The sheer number of courts hearing IP cases means that it is unlikely that all the
courts are ruling in accord; local variables and externalities are likely to be factors in the
decisions. Marukawa sums up 'the problem as foHows:
... the court is improper and weak. The local courts tend to stand in
favor of local interests, so if a foreign company files a lawsuit in a local
court, it may be difficult to win the case. Even if you win a case, the
judgment may not be enforced; as the system of enforcing ajudgment by
the court is still weak, the domestic company, which [lost the case] by the
court as piraci' will keep on producing the copied product with no
interference. 7
At the root, the Chinese approach to developing its economy since 1979 is very
similar to that taken by other East Asian countries such as Japan. Chalmers Johnson
describes the Japanese "plan rational economy," in which the widely agreed-upon
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overarching goal of high-speed economic growth led to collaboration between the
government and business, with a powerful and developmentally-oriented political center,
or what Johnson calls a capitalist developmental state, directing business into
advantageous sectors and attempting to create conditions that would lead to fast
economic growth. 73 In Japan, the government was attempting to create economic growth
by working closely with its businesses, for example by directing the zaibatsu into areas of
business it felt should be further developed. Other nations in Northeast Asia, including
South Korea and Taiwan, later followed similar models of economic developmentalism.
The Chinese case, while different on the surface, is similar in that there is a clear
overarching goal of fast economic growth; in the Chinese case, the model has been called
a "socialist market economy," but the basic message of government intervention for fast
economic growth remains much the same; in the case of China, the term "market
socialism" has been interpreted to encompass a "whatever works" mentality toward
economic growth. Following several decades of colonialism, economic hardship and
diminished international political power, China hopes to take a place as one ofthc
world's largest and most powerful economies. As Oded Shenkar of Obi 0 State University
puts it, "rf the Chinese Empire was a regional player, loday's ClUna sees itself as a global
player with interests reaching far beyond its ancient sphere of influence of East Asia.,,74
Throughout East Asia, capitalist developmental stales have lISed methods such as
government subsidies and protective tariffs in order to protect nascent industry; in China,
lax IPR law enforcement is being used similarly, as an instrument for economic
development. According to a State Intellectual Property Office official,
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In order to grab as much market share as possible, mighty foreign rivals,
with advanced technologies and optimized-management models, may plot
against domestic manufacturers by all means, especially IPRs. 75
This speaks to the crux of the matter: tbe market. While the Chinese government accuses
foreign corporations of seeking to unscrupulously gain market share by accusing
domestic companies of IPR infringement, the real ity is that these domestic companjes are
committing this infringement in relative freedom - and in some cases, even directly
subsidized by the government - and making a lot of money by doing it, willIe also taking
market share away from their foreign partners and competitors. The developmentalist
state seeks to protect and nourish growing industries; in the case of China, one of the
tools tbe government is using to help develop its economy is its IPR laws, or lax
enforcement thereof, or, in other words, lPR non-protection as one spoke of Chinese
industrial policy. A telling example is that fact that foreign investors must share their IP
on an equal basis with their Chinese partners; by requiring that such foreign technology
be shared with domestic firms, the government is in effect subsidizing research and
development. With the Chinese government constantly working toward economic
growth, with the goal of making Crona into a global economk powerhouse - an economy
that will make those of its former colonizers seem small by comparison - lax IPR
enforcement is seen "as an instrument, a means of helping domestic companies become
compe~itive on

the global market and dominant domestically_

In addition to attempting to develop tbe Chinese economy, the Cbinese

government's lax approach to IPR enforcement is affected by the interplay between
domestic and international politics. This situation can be viewed, in the words of Robert
Putnam, as a ''two-level game." On the international front - the "external" level of
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negotiation - actors such as the WTO and the United States are exerting pressure on the
Chinese government to more effectively protect their corporations' lPRs. Meanwhile, at
the domestic level of negotiation, China is a capitalist developmental state and economic
development is at the top of the agenda. In effect, the result is that while the Chinese
government must have strong, WTO-compliant IP laws on its books and make at least a
passable effort to enforce them, the government's passive non-enforcement amounts to a
huge subsidy for domestic industry.
Foreign corporations enter into partnerships with domestic finns, who then have
the technical know-how to become fierce competitors. Domest'ic rnmufacturing firms,
freed from the research and development costs that saddle the foreign finns because they
can simply use the foreign firms' designs with linle fear ofrepercllssion, can focus on
low-cost manufacturing. Further, overhead costs such as for software are vi,rtuaHy
eliminated, because pirated software is available for free. China's lax attitude toward!
intellectual property persists because it is so beneficial to the domestic economy, a,nd thus
exists as a result of the Chinese's government's developme.ntalist economic polit,ical
culture. In the end, because the United States has

fail~d

to follow thfOUgh on threatened

economic sanctions 76 and foreign corporations have proved to be willing to continue to
invest in China regardless of the IPR-protection circumstan.ces, the domest'ic level of
negotiation takes priority and economic developmentalism -and diminished IP law
enforcement - takes the day. This suggests that contrary to the views of Marxist scholars
such as Sell, the government in this developing country has not been. cowed by the
demands of MNCs; as in South Africa, the Chinese government has resisted IPRs, this
time because of direct domestic economic gains to be made. Contrary to the popular
76
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view, then, IPR protection is not necessarily an important tool for economic
development.
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MICROSOFT V. EUROPE: EXPANSION AND ANTITRUST

A third important case that illustrates the role of governments in intellectual
property protection is the ongoing case of Microsoft vs. the European Commission,77 in
which the European Commission (EC) has taken a proactive stance in dismantling a
perceived monopoly on the part of American software giant Microsoft, at the expense of
protecting Microsoft's intellectual property. This case is in many ways the outlier of the
three discussed in this paper, as the European economy does not stand to benefit in any
directly tangible way from this decision. Rather, it appears that this stance stems from a
political culture that prioritizes antitrust policy and the rule of law ahead of IF protection,
rather than from any directly demanded benefits to European companies or consumers.
The European Union is characterized by a legalistic political culture, in which strict
adherence to the rule oflaw - the idea that authority should only be exercised in
accordance with laws, and not arbitrarily in individual cases - is viewed not only as a
way to combat cronyism and related particularistic market intervention, but as an
effective way to hold a diverse Europe together. Within a long history of a strong,
autonomous bureaucracy that is linked inextricably to the EU itselfin the minds of
constituents, it is inevitable that this bureaucracy would want to increase and perpetuate
its role by increasing its size and importance. In order to accomplish this, the EC has
invoked the European rule of law norm in order to expand the European legal mandate
into a new arena - international antitrust and intellectual property rights - and set a
precedent for the future.

n For the pwposes of this case, Europe can be treated as a cohesive state because the case deals only with
the European Commission, not with national governments.
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The story begins ostensibly in March of 2004, when the Competition Directorate
of the European Commission, then headed by Mario Monti, ruled that Microsoft was
abusing its dominant market position by automatically including installation of its media
player software, Windows Media Player, with every installation of its newest operating
system, Windows XP, in a practice called "bundling."78 Ad~itionally, Microsoft was
purportedly "refusing to supply" interfaces that would allow servers using operating
systems other than Windows 79 to communicate with Windows computers. so This decision
was the result of an investigation that began in 1998 when Sun Microsystems, a
competing software company, brought an antitrust complaint against Microsoft in tbe EC
Competition Directorate, accusing Microsoft of illegally programming its network
interfaces such that separate, proprietary codes known only to Microsoft were needed in
order to achieve interoperability.sl
The decision stated that Microsoft must pay sizeable fines, "unbWldle" the
softw.are in question and divulge some of the Windows source code - a kind of code
called middleware interfaces - so fuat competitors witr be able to produce software that
can seamlessly integrate into Windows XP. While Microsoft appealed the decision and
the case has been in process in the European Court of jJustice, in December of 2004 the
Court of First Instance, where the case is being heard, made a preliminary ruling that
Microsoft would have to implement the stipulations oftlle ruling immediately, without
78 "Bundling," or "tying," refers in this case to the marketing practice of packaging several items together
within a single product In this case, the pI'Oduct in question is Windows XP and the different items are
Outlook. Windows Media Player, apd the Windows XP operating system software, among others.
79 One example of such an operating system is Linux., an open-source operating system which is
increasingly popular among corporate users.
80 A workgroup server is a computer that serves a central function, such as file storage, in a network of
"client" machines, used by employees around the world, which make use of such functions during day-to
day activities.
81 There is an international standard code for these interfaces, onto which Microsoft had unscrupulously
built, claiming that it was only 'adding on' to the standard code.
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waiting for the results of the appeal process. Although the proceedings of this case are
confidential upon the request of Microsoft, it seems likely that this decision was made in
anticipation ofan eventual rejection of Microsoft's appeal. The

Ee has expressed

considerable confidence in the strength of its legal case, and outside observers have stated
that Microsoft was indeed most likely behaving in a way that abused its dominant market
position. Most recently, as of the time of writing Microsoft bad proposed a plan for
implementation and was waiting for approval from the Ee.
The Ee is also carrying out an ongoing competition investigation, begun under
Monti,82 of Microsoft's proposed acquisition of ContentGuard, a digital rights
management (DRM) software company. Although Microsoft altered its original
proposal SJ and will now share ownership equally with Time Warner and Thomson, a
French technology interest, the Ee has expressed continuing concern about the possibility
for Microsoft to abuse its market position in the same way that occurred with Outlook
and Windows Media Player. DRM software is used to prevent privacy of digital audio
and video files while allowing legitimate users who have paid for the files to use them
freely. This kind of software is gaining in importance as digital music and movies have
become dramatically more popular over the past five years. ContentGuard holds a
number of patents in this area and its standard is the basis of the International Standards
Organization's MPEG Rights Expl1ession Language, wInch sets an international standard
for rights .and usage of digital audio and video files. 84 The EC has expressed concern that
Microsoft's acquisition of COIltentGuard would allow the software giant to dominare in

Monti left offioe in November, 2004.
The original proposal staled that Microsoft and Time Warner would each control 50 percent of
ConteotGuard.
Sol Gray, 2005.
lQ
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yet another area of the software industry and thus to stifle competition in the same way it
purportedly did in the operating-systems arena.
While the 2004

Ee ruling was ftrst and foremost an antitrust ruling, its

implications in the field of intellectual property rights are an important side effect. By
ruling that Microsoft would have to divulge some of the Wi.ndows XP source code to
competitors, the

Ee essentially stated., in a very roundabout way, that it should have a

strong degree of control over Mjcrosoft's intellecrual property. As a source within the EC
Competition Directorate staff stated,
"We have operated under the assumption that the code this decision deals
with does faU in the category of lntellectual property, and thus our
decision stands the highest legal test that can be applied., that competition
will be eliminated] witholJlt such a decision. However, the decision did not
take the position that there is intellectual property here ... ,,85
Esseilt"iaiJIy, the EC has stated that the IF in this case is inconsequential, if it even exists.
Thjs viewpoint is at odds with the facts of the case. Although in a statement explaining
the 2004 decision, the EC called the middleware interfaces "the hooks at the edge of the
source code which allow one product to talk to another" and stated that '<the interfaces do
not concern the Windows source code,,,86 the communications protocols in question were
in fact proprietary and part of the source code. However, this is the case illegally, as
Microsoft had previously agreed to adhere to the international standard code.
Additionally, two of the main participants on this so-called "interoperability" side
of the case, Sun Microsystems and Novell Inc., both of which manufacture competing
server software, have little substantive interest in the outcome of the case, as Sun had a
pre-existing license for the interfaces and Novell settled its antitrust claims against
Microsoft in the United States for a large sum of money and without securing such a
85
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license. 87 In short, Microsoft bought Sun and Novell off; this behavior suggests that
Microsoft is attempting to act outside the rule of law, contrary to the standard in Europe.
This is confirmed by the fact that the EC has pursued the interoperability side'ofthe case
even without materially interested complainants; clearly, it is the lack of respect for the
rule of law that has offended. It seems almost as if the complaints were an excuse for the
EC to investJigale Microsoft's behavior. This represents a unique attitude toward
intellectual property rights and antitrust practices on the part of the EC, that IPRs should
fall secondary to antitrust practices; such an attitude can be explained by a number of
different factors. It reffects the core reasoning behind the c'a,se: that the EC has its own
motives.
Evident1ly, Emopean economic and political priorities have shifted away from a
preference for intellectual property rights protectioll. This shift could have occurred in
favor of increased protection of European software consumers, or in favor of encouraging
competition, or in order to give a boost to European companies. However, none of these
explanations appears to completely explain the phenomenon. For example, it does not
appear that European consumers have as yet been significantly harmed by Microsoft's
practices or that they wiil benefit from the unbundling of the Windows XP package, and,
more importantly, European consu.mers were not among the complainants or the
interested parties in the case. In fact, the most cornmon prediction is that the unbundling,
which will in ail [ikdihood result in one version of Windows XP being sold without
Windows Media Player (under the name "Windows XP Edition N")88 while the original,
bundled software package remains available. will result in only a very minimal marker
Transcript of Microsoft news teleconference with US journalists and analysts regarding European Coun
of First Instance order on interim measures, 22 December, 2004.
88 Microsoft statement on European Commission process, March 28,2005.
87
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impact. 89 While part of Micros~ft's appeal relies on the complaints of other software
makers who manufacture software that may rely on Windows Media Player,90 and who
would theoretically be harmed by the ruling, in reality Windows Media Player is a free
download and the market is unlikely to be changed. by the existence of Edition N.
Obviously, consumers would rather receive more software for the same price.
Additionally, other email and media player programs are easily usable with the existing
version of Windows XP, as any user who uses Qua1comm's Eudora email program or
Apple Computer's iTunes music player can attest. Although EC officials have stated that
the goal of the ruling was to benefit European consumers by encouraging competition, it
seems that conswners have actually not been a driving force.
It is also unlikely that European software companies will be significantly aided

by this ruling. The complainant that brought about the original investigation of
Microsoft's market practices was Sun Microsystems, a software maker based in Santa
Clara, Califomia. In addition to Sun Microsystcms, nine other "interested third parties"
were admined to the proceedings in the 2004 decision. These parties include corporations
including Lotus Corporation, Time Warner, Novell Inc., and RealNetworks, all
American-based companies. The main corporate proponent of the bundling/tying side of
the decision has been has been RealNetworks, a software company based in Seattle,
Washington whose main product is a media player that competes directly with Windows
Media Player. In short, the companies that are most in favor of the EC ruling - those that
stand to benefit the most from it - are not European companies but American companies.
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Taken together, both the bundling/tying side of the decision and the
interoperability side seem to have been made not for protection of a politically powerful
consumer base or for protection of European companies, but for the sake of antitrust
practices on their own merits. This strongly suggests that the EC is not using its antitrust
policies for any instrumental purpose in the usual sense of the word. Furthermore, EC
concerns about Microsoft's proposed ContentGuard acquisition persisted even after the
proposal was revised to give French software interest Thomson a one-third share in
ownership ,9 J equal to that of proposed American partners Microsoft and Time Warner.
Although a European company now stands to gain in this case, EC authorities remain
skeptical of the opportunities it could create for Microsoft to further consolidate and
abuse its market position. It seems clear that the EC wants its case against Microsoft to be
both airtight and extremely thorough.
Another, stronger possibility is that the EC is hoping to foster European
competition against the American software giant by punching holes in Microsoft's
dominant market position. While this was likely part of the decision-making process, as
potential aid to European software companies would have been seen as a net gain, this
does not seem to have been a guiding principle. Had this been the case, European
companies would have been more eagerly encouraging tho investigation, and would be
more actively seeking its conclusion in their favor, which seems to be imminent. The fact
that this support is very minimal suggests that the EC !is doing more than si,mply fostering
pr~xistent

competition; it is attempting to create competition for the sake of

competition. As stated by the contact in the EC Competition Directorate, although the
decision was made "based on the effects of [Microsoft's] conduct on [the European]
91
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market," it was "never directly about nationality," and in making the decision the EC
aimed to "preserve competition to the benefit of consumers, irrespective of nationality',92
- although, as shown above, it is unclear how consumers will benefit from such a
decision.
It is likel y that some of the impetus for the EC investigation and subsequent ruling

came from observation of the antitrust proceedings against Microsoft in the United
States. These proceedings culminated in a settlement between Microsoft and the U.S.
Department of Justice in 2001, which was similar in many ways to the 2004 EC ruling.
There is "an overlap in the kind of information to be disclosed by Microsoft," and the BC
case "takes a similar approach, although the starting positions were different," according
to the EC source, who noted that EC officials meet regularly with officials from the U.S.
Department of Justice to discuss the issue. 93 While there were no fines imposed in the
U.S. case, the settlement stipulated that Microsoft had to license its operating system to
computer makers on uniform terms for a period of five years, banned retaliation against
computer makers choosing to use non-Microsoft software components with the Windows
operating system, and included compulsory licensing of any intellectual property
necessary for competitors to produce software that would work as smoothly on a
Windows PC or server as Microsoft products did. 94 While tbis settlement diverges from
the EC ruling in that Microsoft was still permitted to bundle its own software with its
operating system - software such as the widely used Internet Explorer and Windows
Media Player - the requirement for sharing of Microsoft's middleware interfaces is very
similar to that included in the EC ruling. Both bodies viewed Microsoft's tactics as abuse
Op. cit
Ibid.
~ Pruitt, 2001.
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of a dominant market position, and both stated that the only way to level the playing field
for competitors was to force Microsoft to divulge some of its intellectual property. The
main difference between these two instances seems to be that while American
competition in the software industry stood to gain directly from t!he settlement, this does
not appear to be the case in Microsoft v. Europe, and thus that the U.S. was using
antitrust proceedings in an instrumental way.
Therefore, there seem to be two possibilities for what impetus may have caused
the Ee to make its 2004 ruling against Microsoft: the need to protect and encourage
Microsoft's European competition in much the same way the U.S. Department of Justice
did in its 2001 settlement and a nonn that prioritizes antitrust action ahead of intellectual
property protection. Europe has also set itself up in several ways to be compared to the
U.S. or to counterbalance to American political and economic power, and this decision is
no exception; as Monti put it, "in this case, the EU was more united than the United
States.,,95 However, although the ruling was against an American company, it is
American companies that will eventually benefit, so it is unlikely that the hope in this
ruling was meant as a jab at American corporations. Rather, it is more important to note
that Microsoft is not a European finn. By focusing its attentions in this precedent-setting
case on a non-European finn with a history of antitrust investigation in the U.S., the EC
avoids angering its constituency.
Notably, there is a strong representation of associations that promote open-source
software. Aside from American companies, the admitted interested third parties are all
industry associations, mostly U.S.-based, that have historically lobbied for open
computing systems and markets, including the Computer Technology Industry
95
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Association,96 the Computer and Conununications Industry Association,97 Free Software
Foundation Europe98 and the Software and Information Industry Association. 99 The opensource movement is the one obvious beneficiary of the ruling. It stands to gain market
share from both the unbundling side of the decision, as open-source media players may
gain in popularity if users are no longer automatically presented with Windows Media
Player, and from the interoperabil!.ity side, as operating systems and other programs face
an obvious disadvantage if they cannot communicate with Windows machines. The opensource movement is contrary to the market ,practices to which the EC is objecting, and it
represents by its nature a possible counterbalance to Microsoft's dominant standing. It is
also by defmition amenable to antitrust ideals: since ilie software is free and the source
code is openly available, open-source companies are not prone to the kinds of behaviors
that Microsoft is accused of. It is also a movement that is inherently good for the
consumer, because

~t

Fepresents competition to "closed-source" companies hke Microsoft

and because it encourages collaboration for a better pI'oduct. The fact that the main
beneficiary of the EC ruling is a movement that is so strongly antitrust is striking and
reflective of the fact that the EC's primary priority here is ostensibly antitrust action.
This reasoning results from long-term importance of the rule oflaw in the
development of the ED. It is commonly agreed that in Europe, an increased rule of lawspecifically driven by several provocative rulings made by the European Court of Justice
- has been central to the increase in integration that has taken place over the last several

About CornpTlA, 2005.
eGA in brief, 2005.
98 About Free Software Foundation Europe, 2004.
99 SlAA Overview, 2005.
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decades. 100 The European legal system is

DOW

one in which international, European

Community law (over which the EC] presides) is supreme to national law of member
states. This is a fairly recent and unique development, and one the EU administration as a
whole holds dear, as it forms the basis for its legal authority. In order for international
law to be effective, it must be viewed as potent and legitimate, rather than as an anemic
third party that can be ignored. As Karen Alter, a specialist in European law at
Northwestern University, puts it,
When violations of law are not pursued, and when violators 'can Italk their
way out of being condemned., the cost of violating raw depreciates...one
needs compliance with European rules to be a priority I'est inattention,
inertia, or the weight of competing interests le-ad to numerous violations of
the law. 101
Protecting and enhancing European rule of law has thus been crucia~ in prol1onged
European integration; this becomes clear when one ,considers the drawn-out battles that
have occurred over things like yogurt cultures. Were the international rule of law weaker,
it seems likely th.at member states would have taken the path of least resistance and the
EU would simply nl:we disintegrated rather than coming to agreements. Creating and
maintaining a culture of a strong European rule of ~aw remalins vital in making the
treaties enforceable and poteRt and, thus, making the EU seem like a serious. undertaking.
At this point, European rule -of law is a deeply entrenched nOml in the EU, and while the
European courts are widely seen as supreme, the value of a strong rule of law, in which
laws are enforced in a strong but even-handed and non-particularistic way, is part of this
nonn. Witllln this culture, a case like Microsoft is an example of the strength of this
nonn. It is being invoked by the EC in order to further the importance of the European
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bureaucracy and increase integration - and, to be sure, there is a strong precedent for
judicial activism furthering European integration. 102
Thus, the decision was to some degree a power play by the EC. The decision
occurred at a time when the ED was in the midst of expansion and facing questions about
its political nature: will it be an intergovernmental institution, as many national
governments would generally prefer, or will it increase in supranational capacity? This
ruling is in some ways central to this debate, in that as Monti made a ruling in an area that
had not previously received much attention from the Ee but in which national
governments were not acting, he was attempting to increase the EC's power by adding a
new area oflitigation. Although the EC has insisted that the case does not break new
ground and rests on "solid legal principles,,,lo3 it does have to potential to fonn a
precedent in other ways. There is now a precedent of having such cases handled by the
EC rather than by national governments. Additionally, once the final ruling is made, there
may be a precedent set that will facilitate the EC's handling of such cases in the future; in
an EU where

insti~tions are

seeking ways to make themselves more credible and

politically potent, such a precedent is highly attractive. According to James Governor, a
London·based analyst for Redmonk, a Bath, Maine market research consulting finn,
Monti apparently wants to impose a historical precedent that will apply to
bundling and tying across a host of industries in the age of digital'
products .. .if such an approach sticks and doesn't collapse under appeal,
then the EU will have put itself forward as the global antitrust regulator in
the face of the weakness of the [U.S.] DOJ. I04
This ties into the importance of the rule of law in the fonnation of the ED. Ifprecedents
such as direct effect and supremacy of European law - both established in Eel cases

Alttnan, 200 I, pp. 17-l8.
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have fonned much of the legal basis for the ED and established European law as
legitimate in the eyes of the public, this decision indicates a continued desire to legally
entrench the EC and the European rule of law.
Regardless of Monti's place within the larger debate over the future of the
European union, it is clear that he did play an important role in the development of the
case against Microsoft, and that his influence remains prevalent months after he left
office. While in office, be plainly made a goal of making EU competition policy
"something to be reckoned with."I05 In fact, he has been criticized even by other EC
officials for being overly harsh; prior to the 2004 ruling. the EC Single Market
Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, intervened because of concerns that the decision could
infringe on IPRs and later be overturned in courts, an outcome which Bolkestein, who at
the time hoped to proceed Monti as Competition Commissioner, hoped to avoid. 106
However, although Monti was zealous in his

pursu~t

of the rule oflaw in antitrust

enforcement, this case was not a one-man show. Rather, this kind of inter-directorate
consultation, along with the EC's very slow and careful invest,igation of the complaints
against Microsoft, including "fonnal expressions ofMicrosoft's doubts" in 2000,2002
and 2003, and a fonnal hearing in March 0[2003 107 indicate that through a methodical
process the EC hopes to come up with a ruling that win stick and form precedent. Th.is
stance has continued with Monti's successor, Neelie Kroes, under whom the EC
Competition Directorate has energetically continued

it~

investigation of the proposed

ContentGuard acquisition and the bundling case against Microsoft, including the January,
2005 ruling calling for immediate implementation of the 2004 EC ruling.
IO~

Krim, 2004.
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Further, while European competition policy seemed to have taken a new shape
after Monti entered office in 1999, he did not act in a vacuum. Rather, Monti did not
single-handedly come up with the idea of promoting stronger competition policy, but
instead acted within a political culture where strong competition policy was viewed as a
worthy ideal. This grows out of the importance of the rule of law in Europe, which
perhaps has arisen alongside the growth of the ED bureaucracy, an arena in which
extremely detailed laws have proven thus far to be an important tool in European
integration. This seems to have given rise, in hum, to a sense that the European market
which did not exist prior to the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 - as a
whole benefi t5 from increased levels of competition., and that in order for the European
market to be successful, strict market principles must trump any appearance of cronyism
or selective enforcement. For the EC to have allowed Microsoft to continue its seemingly
illegal dominance unopposed would have been uncharacteristic. One analyst, Daniel J.
Gif(ord of the University of Minnesota, noted that antitrust rhetoric in Europe uses "the
American language of consumer welfare, but I think [they] mean rivalry for the sake of
rivalry."I08 This nonn is sufficiently strong that in the case of Microsoft it has decisively
trumped the desire to protect corporations' intellectual property rights, although
European corporations were among those advocating most vociferously for the
implementation of TRIPS. Again, conveniently, no European firm IS involved with this
case, so a strong antitrust norm can be effectively harnessed for furthering European
integration without harming European finns' iIP. By contrast, what would have happened
if Microsoft happened to be a European finn? It seems likely that the Ee would have

been vociferously accused of overstepping its bounds and of failing to protect IPRs.
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This result counters the findings of Susan K. Sell, who found that international
intellectual property protection resulted almost exclusively from pressure exerted by
corporations on states, which were willing to cooperate in order to pl'otect their domestic
businesses and attract foreign capital. 109 Where Sell emphasizes the importance of
governmental acquiescence to the demands of both domestic and foreign corporations,
this model f3.!ils on two counts in this case: the pressure has been against intellectual
property protection, not for it; and the pressure carne from individuals and interest
groups, not from corporations. Additionally, the result here counters the findings of Keith
Maskus, whose model states that IP protection is needed by both states and corporations

in order to attract capita) and foster

innovatio~

and that intellectual property protection

arises endogenously with economic development. llo In this case, however, the result is
the direct opposite: the Ee's position is that reduced IF protection is needed to foster
innovation (by encouraging the development of viable European competition), and it
'seems to have decreased with the increase in economic development that the EU has
brought about.
The Microsoft v. Europe case, standing outside the most common models, can
therefore be viewed as somewhat of an outlier in tenns of international IP protection; it is
an example ofthe special conditions that can lead governments to act counter to these
models. In this case, the process leading to this kind of action can be viewed as foMlows:
Microsoft's monopolistic market tactics, when combined with a legalistic political
culture, antitrust priorities and Monti's antitrust goals, led to an EC ruling that infringed
on Microsoft's intellectual property. In short, the European political culture is unique in
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that antitrust practices are elevated, while other goals that are commonly pursued by
developed countries, such as IPR protections, are therefore secondary. In this case,
intellectual property was the casualty of the EU's particular political culture, harnessed
by the EC for instrumental purposes. In this case, Microsoft is viewed as an interloper,
seeking to use unfair practices to maintain market dominance and avoid being subject to
the rule of law. The EC's actions in this case stem from a Europe-wide norm emphasizing
the importance of the rule oflaw, and Microsoft's IP losses are viewed as a byproduct.
This norm, which developed over a long period oftime, is here being invoked
instrumentally, as the EC asserts itself in a new policy areoa. In being an outlier, then, the
Microsoft v. Europe case is illustrative of a larger phenomenon of governmental
resistance to IPRs. Although IPRs are not always' resisted for instrumental reasons, in
these three cases states have defied expectations for JPR-related behavior to do so.
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CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD

Governmental resistance to the increase in the international intellectual property
rights can thus best be viewed as a result of states' individual political interests and
prefel1ences. However, these interests and preferences are not a unifying concept; as a '
result, while states clearly are using IPRs in an instrumental way, these state reactions
cannot be viewed as monolithic. In fact, this phenomenon fits best into an interactive
framework: these policy outcomes are the result of the interactions between states'
particular, unique political situations and the demands placed upon states by international
and domestic factors. Thus, policy recommendations must be based primarily on the
varying ways these interactions can be colored.
One of the most important points suggested by this work is the idea that the
popular wisdom, that states are beholden to MNCs in the international IPR area, is
incorrect. If states are using resistance to IPR regimes freely as a policy instrument and
managing not to totally alienate foreign investment or stifle innovation, then it must be
that MNC lobbying groups are not as powerful as much of the literature suggests they
are, and that IPRs are not as important a development tool as one might think. This
suggests that perhaps states should go further: they should resist the increasingly
protective global IPR regime more often, if such resistance would serve an instrumental
purpose. For example, the generic drug experience in Brazil should be illustrative for the
South African government, in that drug companies are still willing to operate in Brazil
despite the fact that Brazil has repeatedly invoked the TRlPS exceptions for public health
emergencies. Although the South African government has been highly skittish about
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these exceptions, it seems clear that thanks to a transnational activist network's attention
to the issue, a global public-health nonn would make it unappealing, from a publicity
point of view, for drug companies to pull out of South Africa if TRIPS exceptions were
invoked for generic ARVs. Overall, this work suggests that states, even developing
countries, can effectively attract foreign investment and [oster innovation while resisting
IPRs with a good deal more confidence than the literature suggests is possible. The cases
discussed here, as well as numerous others, suggest that states can and should be more
critical in the IPR arena, because the rules are more malleable than is commonly
discussed and certainly not monolithic.
This research also suggests that if the IPR regime in a given state is less than
ideally protective, corporations should (and will) not avoid investing in the state entirely,
but rather will adapt their i.nvestments and business practices to work within a given
country's political situation, interests and preferences. This practice of adaptation has
already manifested itself in some instances. For example, Marukawa noted that Japanese
automotive manufacturers operating in China had adapted to the ineffective IPR regime
in an unexpected way, by manufacturing expensive, high-end technologies in China
because local manufacturers would not have the manufacturing capacity to copy these
complicated technologies, III even though by Chinese law they have rights to the designs.
Likewise, in South Africa drug companies have adapted to threats on the IPR front, such
as the lawsuits and the demonstrations of the effectiveness of imported generic AR V s put
on by the TAC, by working more closely with the government, which has proved
repeatedly to be a weak responder in terms ofIPR resistance, ifnot in word then certainly
in action. By this close alignment, these pharmaceutical firms give the appearance of
III
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working with, rather than against, South Africa on IPR issues, while also reminding the
government of the potential consequences of resisting IPR protections (although this
research suggests that this may be a bluff). Thus, drug companies in South Africa have
managed to harness the- Mbeki government's skittishness to their advantage, at least for
the time being.
A third point this work raises is the idea that in the arena of IPRs, developing
countries can and should listen to the demands of their constituents. Essentially, this is a
question of the balance between democracy and a government's interests and preferences.
For example, in South Africa, it seems clear that the Mbeki government's interests and
preferences do not jibe with the demands of South Africans, who have had to face a
severe epidemic in which most public-health response has come not from the
government, but from NGOs and outside actors. While the government has doubtless
behaved in such a way while anempting to balance concerns about the AIDS epidemic
with the "culture of shame" and concerns about foreign investment and South African
economic development, so as to please a diverse and

co~plicated constituency,

it has

failed to address the AIDS crisis in a substantive way until compelled by a transnational
activist network invoking an international public health norm. This is a strategy that
allows the government to avoid the appearance of making unpopular decisions
voluntarily, but it also disenfranchises South Africans who have had to wait far longer for
decisive actions regarding ARV IPRs than they would have had to if the government was
proactive. This research shows that, at least in the arena ofIPR resistance and invoking
TRIPS public health exceptions, governments should not ignore the demands of their
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constituencies in order to avoid alienating foreign investment because this is unlikely to
occur.
Finally, this study raises the question oftbe overall IPR balance. Has the global
IPR regime tipped too far toward protection? What would constitute an ideal, fairly
balanced IPR regime? It must be noted that IPRs did not exist in the current sense of tile
word until fairly recently; the term "inteUectual property" did not come into conunon use
until the creation of the World Intellectual Property Organization in 1967.
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With the

advent of TRIPS and the fact that WIPO is pushing for an even more protective global
IPR regime, have states allowed MNCs to have too much control over this arena of
international law? This research suggests that states are, in fact, resisting this regime, it
seems that barring a change in the tide, they are likely to continue to do so.

112

"Intellectual property."

58

APPENDIX A: Chinese IPR laws

IPR law in China is a patchwork, appearing in a number of different legal bodies.
Crucial for China's entry into the World Trade Organization was harmonization of its
domestic patent laws, trademark laws and copyright laws with the requirements of the
WTO. China has also been a signatory to the Patent Cooperation Treaty since 1994; this
treaty provides for an "international" patent application deemed acceptable by all
signatory nations. I I) Patent law is now administered by the Patent Administration Office,
which is largely responsible for filing and enforcement of patents. There are provisions
for licensing fees; there is also a provision allowing for compulsory licensing (with a fee)

in the case of compelling state interest in a given piece of intellectual property, as well as
for the circumstances allowable under TRlPS. 114 If foreigners or foreign corporations
apply for patents, the application has to be made via a patent agency and will be treated
according to treaties and international organizations to which both China and the other
country belong, according to the "principal of reciprocity." "Invention-creations" created
while the inventor "in execution of the tasks" assigned to him by his employer are
regarded as the property of the employing entity, who can choose to pursue a patent.
For a patent to be granted, the invention-creation in question must possess
"novelty," meaning that no identical invention has been disclosed, "inventiveness,"
meaning that the invention-creation represents "significant progress," and "practical
applicability," meaning that the invention can be made and "produce effective results.,,115
In China, where things like drugs and movies are often pirated long before they hit the
113
114

\l5

"peT contracting states."
I.e. circumstances of national emergency and cross-licensing of new with necessary prior patents.
People's Republic of China, "Patent law oftbe People's Republic of China," 2000.
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legitimate marketplace, the "novelty" requirement can pose a problem because it is often
interpreted such that items which have already been pirated can no longer be patented; on
example of this conundrum is Pfizer's drug Viagra. 116 Patents last for a period of 10 years
for inventions. A number of things are excluded from patent protection, including
scientific disooveries, mentall

activ~ties,

methods for the diagnosis or treatment of

diseases, animal and plmt varieties and substances obtained by nuclear transformation;
however, the processes that theso things may involve are patentable. There are provisions
for monetary fines as penalties for patent infringement offenses, limited at confiscation of
the

illega~

income

p~us

three times the amount of illegal income or a maximum RMB

50,000 (about $6,040). Review of patents andi adjudication occurs both through the Patent
Administration Office and through Intermediate People's courts. \l7
Chinese trademark law is generally similar to that elsewhere. For a trademark to
be protected, in all cases except those of "weH-known" trademarks the trademark must be
registered with the Trademark Office and will be protected for a renewable period of 10
years. The law provides

fOF

punishment for use of designs that are "identical or sirnillar"

to registered trademarks and for aiding or abetting such infringements. There areaJIso
provisions for trademarks indicating geographjc ori~ quality classes and like
qualifications. There are a number of exceptions ,that can prevent a trademark from being
registered, such as marks that are deemed to be "detrimenta'l to sodalist morals" or those
that are seen as prejudiced against any nationality. I 18
"Well-known" trademarks are protected under different rules, which took effect in
2003 and provide protection for marks that are widely recognized but that may not be
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registered. For a trademark to be considered "well-known," it must be well-known
throughout China. This can make it difficult for foreign companies to protect their
trademarks, as labels that are famous in Shanghai may well be unheard of in rural
provinces. For example, Burger King was denied protection; according to Laura W.
Young, a parmer at Wang and Wang, a law fum that specializes in international
intellectual pr:operty disputes, "from the Chinese point of view, such international
products are generally luxury products, and thus are naturally unknown to the great
majority of Chinese." 119 Paradoxically, however, China is party to the Paris Convention
of 1883, and is thus required to protect trademarks and brand names "without the
requirement of tHing or registration applicable under national law, whether or not such
names Conn part ofa trademark, thereby recognizing the importance of trade names with
respect to lintellectual property.,,120 There are currently about 69 "well-known"
trademarks recognized in China, about 11 of which are foreign-owned. 121
The third body oflaw that the Chinese government adjusted to fit WTO
requirements is that of copyright law. Chinese copyright law protects the works of
foreigners and non-Chinese nationals, whether or not their home countries are signatories
to copyright-protecting treaties with China. Works are protected for a period of the
author's life plus 50 years, or for 50 years for corporate works. Authors also retain
"moral rights" to their work. 122

In addition to these three bodies of law, which have the largest amount of
significance in the field of intellectual property, other parts of Chinese law also include
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"Another list of well-known marks published."
People's Republic of China, ..Copyrighl law of the People's Republic of China," 2001.
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IP-related provisions. For example, there is a Product Quality law intended to discourage
the sale of fake or inferior goods. It calls for corporations to adopt quality control
procedures and makes it illegal to ''pass of a fake product as a genuine one.,,123 China
also has a law prohibiting "unfair competition," within which is included "deception of
consumers by passing off a registered trademark of another person" and "infringing
others' business secrets.'''24 The law was implemented as part of China's transition from
a planned economy to a market economy, in order to encourage competition. This
highlights the fact that through its IPR protections, the Chinese government is seeking to
encourage its domestic industries; the protection of foreign companies' W is secondary
and falls by the wayside.
One perennial complaint about intellectual property protection in China (or the
lack thereof) has been that there is no penalty for crossing the Chinese border with
pirated goods. In 2004, following pressure from the United States, the Chinese
government instituted new customs rules in an attempt to remedy this situation. The new
law allows for owners to register their IP with the State Administration of Customs
(SAC). Owners are then permitted to request that the SAC detain suspect goods at the
border, and the SAC is likewise required to notify owners if suspect goods have been
detained. However, the law is fairly opaque and does not seem to favor the IP owner; for
example, owners are required to pay the costs of storing detained goods until it can be
determined whether or not they are illegal, a process which does not even have to begin
until 30 days following the incident. lfthe goods are deemed "fit for public
consumption," they are not automatically transferred to the IP owner as one might expect

123 People's Republic of China, "Product Quality Law of The People's Republic of China," 2004.
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but rather may be sold to the owner in retum for "adequate compensation." Furthermore,
although the law allows for crirninalliability "if a crime is cOl1Stituted in the import or
export of goods infringing IPR," customs violations do not constitu,tea criminal violation
in and of themselves. The only pena~Jty for these violations is ,confiscation of the goods in

question. 125 Thus, it must be noted that a persistent and signiJlcant faiiing of Chinese JPR
law is in the customs law arena.

125 People's Republic of China, "Regulation of People's Republic of China on Customs Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights: Order of the State Council of the People's Republic of China No. 395," 2004.
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